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As a decentralised communication technology, the Internet has offered much 
autonomy and unprecedented communication freedom to the Chinese public. Yet 
the Chinese government has imposed different forms of censorship over 
cyberspace. However, the Hong Kong erotic photo scandal reshuffles the 
traditional understanding of censorship in China as it points to a different territory.  
The paper takes the Hong Kong erotic photo scandal in 2008 as a case study 
and aims to examine the social and generational conflicts hidden in China. When 
thousands of photos containing sexually explicit images of Hong Kong celebrities 
were released on the Internet, gossip, controversies and eroticism fuelled the public 
discussion and threatened traditional values in China.    
The Internet provides an alternative space for the young Chinese who have 
been excluded from mainstream social discourse to engage in public debates. This, 
however, creates concerns, fear and even anger among the older generations in 
China, because they can no longer control, monitor and educate their children in 
the way that their predecessors have done for centuries.  
The photo scandal illustrates the internal social conflicts and distrust between 
generations in China and the generational conflict has a far-reaching political 
ramification as it creates a new concept of censorship.  
 
Key Words: censorship, China, cyberculture, generational conflicts, moral panics, 
the Internet, youth culture. 
 
***** 
 
1. Introduction  
At approximately 8:30 p.m. on January 27, 2008, a set of photos depicting 
sexual images of Edison Chen and Gillian Chung was released on the Hong Kong 
Discuss Forum. More photos containing Chen and other female celebrities’ erotic 
images were released in the following weeks. It was alleged that someone had 
stolen these photos from Chen’s notebook (by retrieving the already deleted files 
from the computer’s backup system), and the Hong Kong police arrested more than 
ten persons in February 2008. On April 29, 2009, Sze Ho-chun, the I.T. technician 
who stole the photos from Chen’s notebook, was sentenced to jail, which 
concluded the legal pursuit of this incident. It is now believed that thousands of 
copies of the photos were posted online and many are still circulating on the 
Internet today.  
Just as with many other Internet incidents, the Hong Kong photo scandal 
attracted government censorship. A so-called Websites Correction Campaign, 
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which aims to ‘clean up’ pornographic and unhealthy content from the Internet in 
China, was launched later in 2008. As a result, major global websites, such as 
Facebook, Twitter and YouTube were blocked in China as they were deemed to 
contain ‘unhealthy’ material. However, a new interpretation of this online policy 
was given by the government: it was to protect Chinese youth from ‘unhealthy and 
low class materials’.1  
As one of the chapters looking at the ‘National Specific and Cyberculture 
Communities’, I intend to frame my discussion within a global context but with 
Chinese specific. This chapter critically investigates the social tension within the 
Chinese public in the Internet age, and argues that online censorship in China is not 
solely a political product, but as the Hong Kong erotic photo scandal reveals, the 
suppression of the Internet is also driven by the general public in China. This 
chapter frames the popular engagement with the erotic elements of the photo 
scandal against the traditional attitude to sexual desire, and the indigenous history 
of filial piety and contemporary stereotypes of the Chinese youth. By 
understanding the uniqueness of sex scandals in the new media age, and how the 
photo scandal functions as a critical site for the expression and the growth of a 
youth orientated cyber political culture, this chapter also examines the political 
ramifications of the clashing new liberalism and traditional values in a developing 
China. Not only the recent Internet censorship has the unprecedented public 
support, but the mainstream public in fact relies on the government to maintain 
their control over the cultural and social capitals, as the scandal and the Internet 
create concern, fear and even anger among the mainstream public.  
 
2. China and its Great Firewall 
The role of the Internet is a hard one to determine for the Chinese government. 
While China needs the technology to achieve its ‘Four Modernisations’ (Si Ge 
Xian Dai Hua), 2  the nature of the Internet undermines the authoritarian 
government’s monopoly power and ideological control.3 As Sun argues, Chinese 
media in general has always been ‘working together with the state, media 
industries have become key institutions in [the Chinese] society.’4 The single-party 
political system underpins the persistent intervention throughout China’s Internet 
development. China’s Internet censorship has experienced several comprehensive 
and multidimensional evolutions:5 from the traditional blocking and shutting down 
model,6 to reaching commercial/censorship deals with western ICTs giants,7 to the 
more recent voluntary reporting (self-censorship) system; 8 all of which aim to 
legitimate the Party’s authority and restore the mass media-like propagandist 
model.9  
While some authors believe censorship has seriously damaged the democratic 
potential of the Internet;10 some others hold a more optimistic view.11 Studies with 
more pessimistic views tend to play up the role of the government.12 Although the 
process of democratisation and political reform remains largely in the hand of the 
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government, their top-down analytical approach still underestimates the power that 
comes from below. Should the Chinese government possess total control over the 
network, the enforcement of the Internet filtering would not be so inconsistent.13 
There is little doubt that the Internet has become an integrated part of the 
everydayness of urban Chinese.14 This inclusion reinforces people’s engagement 
with the technology and the community it creates. Many authors now have turned 
their attention to the growth of online culture in China.15 In her analysis of e gao 
(reckless doing), Meng traces this Internet phenomenon as a form of political 
communication that departs from the conventional political debates model.16 More 
importantly, this culture jamming like practice on the Chinese Internet creates an 
‘‘underground language’ of parody and irony to evade censorship’.17 
While cyberculture scholars are able to reveal the ‘mass power’ of the Internet, 
they tend to overplay the degree of online civil engagement and generalise the 
public’s attitude towards the new technology. In their investigation of the UAE’s 
cyber political engagement, Allagui and Breslow found that, even without 
censorship, one cannot generalise the Internet as a tool for social inclusion.18 And 
more importantly, together with Mangahas’s chapter on the Filipino scandal 
culture,19 both of their works point out that the Internet is not necessary to be the 
place for direct political engagements. Even though China has the most Internet 
users in the world today, the term ‘ordinary public’ is problematic when only 22.6% 
of the Chinese population have Internet access. 20  Not only rural and regional 
populations are missing out, the Internet diffusion rate is significantly lower among 
the older generations in China.21 The uneven development among different age 
groups underpins a new political struggle in the contemporary China. In her 
thorough study of the youth Internet culture in China, Liu Fengshu argues that,  
 
We need to view the Internet as a technology in interaction with 
some key institutions which affect young people’s lives in 
significant ways, such as the state, the family, the school, higher 
education institutions, the market and the workplace.22 
 
Youth interaction with the Internet in general is much more than the simple 
triangular state-media-public model. But the multidimensional, dynamical, and 
somewhat complex interactions of Chinese youth and the new technology thus 
require a broader contextual analytical framework to understand the politics of 
cyber culture. As the images of the Hong Kong photo scandal were released and 
viewed, e gao, or cultural spoofs, fuelled the online discussions. Fake photos, 
videos, songs and even fake rumours were created to fulfil people’s desire for 
celebrity dramas. Furthermore, the photo scandal took place at the same time as the 
heavy snow disaster in southern China during January/February 2008. The snow 
disaster not only claimed hundreds of lives, but many major freeways and railways 
were blocked at the time, which prevented millions of rural workers from returning 
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home to celebrate the traditional Lunar New Year with their families.  However, 
when the first photo, depicting Edison Chen and Gillian Chung Gillian Chung was 
released online, major news services in Hong Kong and China quickly shifted their 
main coverage to the photo scandal. The photo scandal occupied the front pages of 
both Apple Daily and Oriental Daily (two of the largest local newspapers in Hong 
Kong in terms of circulation) for eighteen consecutive days (from 28th January, 
2008 to 14th February, 2008).23Moreover, in comparison to other major events in 
China in 2008, such as the Sichuan Earthquake and the Olympic Games, even 
though the photo scandal seems to contain nothing of significance in terms of 
politics and economics, but it stands out in many ways. A general Google search of 
the Chinese characters, ‘yan men zhao shi jian’ (the erotic photo scandal) generates 
about 124 million results,24 more than twice that of the Beijing Olympic Games 
(31.6 million results) and the Sichuan Earthquake (27.5 million results) combined. 
The snow disaster that took place around the same time as the photo scandal only 
generates about 558,000 Google search results. A more specific Google search 
(Google Discussion) that only illustrates the results from discussion forums shows 
that most major Chinese online forums contain discussion about the photo scandal. 
A Google Discussion search of ‘Chen Guanxi Yanmen Zhao Shijian’ (Edison 
Chen’s erotic photo incident) generates 11,700 results,25 and the results come from 
a diverse range of discussion forums in China, including some of the biggest names 
such as, Tianya, Baidu Tieba,26 Club China, ifeng (Phoenix television network’s 
discussion forum), and many local regional forums, such as Sichuan Zaixian 
(Sichuan Online), and even overseas Chinese forums, such as NZ Chinese BBS 
(Bulletin Board Services). These results illustrate the widespread publicity and 
interest from all across China and even around the globe. Furthermore, posts about 
the scandal often receive tremendous publicity and many hits (reading rate). For 
example, a post claiming it provides the download link to 1,300 photos on Doclan 
BBS (Bian Mu Bu Luo), a BBS for dog lovers, received 1,939,904 hits. Chinese 
Internet users were utilising every possible space on the Internet to pursue and 
engage in the discussion and development of the photo scandal.   
Not only do these figures reflect people’s preferences for celebrity dramas 
over serious national issues; but they show that the photos scandal blatantly 
explored the traditional taboo of sexual desire, relationships and eroticism. The 
Internet provides the oxygen for a sexuality and eroticism-driven scandal to grow. 
These developments create fear and anger within the public, as many parents and 
teachers were furious with the development of the scandal. The uneasiness among 
the older generations transformed into a source of suppression against the Internet. 
As mentioned, a new regulatory measure, the Website Correction Campaign was 
launched in China as a response to the photo scandal. Since the traditional methods 
of blocking and covering up are no longer working in the dynamic Internet world, 
the Website Correction Campaign, shifted its focus to a grass-roots and public 
level to address the ‘concerns’ and ‘panics’ of parents and schools. Targeting the 
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traditional cultural and educational institutions reflect the government’s intention 
to gain parents’ and schools’ support to effectively achieve its political interests 
indirectly.  
The government’s initiative this time, received tremendous public support 
from mainstream society, as many parents and school teachers believe the 
government’s initiatives promote a ‘healthy, culturally constructive youth’. 27 
China’s Ministry of Culture even called for online essays in 2010 across all major 
news websites in China, such as Sohu, Tencents, Tom, Sina, Rednet, News 163 and 
all official news websites, to encourage Internet users to express their support for 
the government’s website correction campaign. 28  The positive feedback from 
mainstream society and their active engagement with the development of this 
censorship reveals some deeply rooted internal conflicts within the Chinese society. 
The hope of regulating the Internet comes from below, and the new Web Sites 
Correction Campaign, as Fung points out, received strong support from the 
mainstream public:  
 
Intellectuals, teachers and parents, they all support the 
government to impose some kind of restrictions online. But 
apparently those parents would not consider the other side of the 
story, which is the freedom of information. The Internet was 
initially created as a government-free platform for everyone to 
access … [to voice] whatever opinion and ranges of expressions, 
I guess sometimes we should tolerate ... a wide range of diversity 
[of opinions]. In this particular case [the photo scandal], those 
educated parents are really the older generations, and also 
conservative, and that is why they support the government.29  
 
3. Nudity, moral panics and social censorship  
The binary growth of the publicity of the photo scandal and the support to the 
government’s new censorship is largely framed by two of the most important 
cultural/social contexts in China: the suppression of personal desires, and the 
emphasis of filial piety. The suppression of personal desire in Chinese culture is 
particularly obvious in the area of sexual desire. The idea of sexual desire and 
eroticism can always work with fear, embarrassment, lost control and social stigma 
in China. This is a common perception that is held by many Chinese across the 
board. The Internet, however, not only provides a platform for political expression, 
but it provides the opportunity for many young Chinese to explore their desires in 
the most sensitive areas of the Chinese moralities. The fact that more than 66% of 
Internet users are under the age of thirty (31% are under 19 years old)30 underpins 
a different social perception and moral value. The Chinese government in fact has 
a strong intention to promote better and more open sexual education as sexually 
transmitted diseases such as HIV have become an increasing threat to China’s 
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public health.31 The state’s attitude, however, has not been transmitted down to the 
wider public. Despite the increasing effort from the government and increasingly 
liberal and open minded attitudes among the younger generations, the campaign of 
sexual education remains ‘limited to official government pamphlets’.32 Tradition 
prevails and ‘many Chinese people still hold the folk view that sexual desire and 
activity need to be carefully regulated, otherwise it will be harmful to your 
health’.33 Confucianism in China preaches the suppression of passionate love and 
its doctrine of strict moral and social codes continuous to dominate Chinese 
attitudes and behaviours toward love and sex up to the present day.34 Parents and 
schools are still struggling to develop an open and direct dialog with the younger 
generations on the topic of sex, relationships and other related issues. As Zhang et 
al. point out, ‘Most Chinese people remain uncomfortable in providing sex 
education to adolescents. Discussions of sex-related issues … are traditionally 
taboo in Chinese culture’.35 Several studies reflect that Chinese parents are either 
incompetent or reluctant to engage in the discussion of sex with their children, and 
that less than 3% of Chinese parents can provide a satisfactory answer to their 
children on sex-related questions. 36  While in the contrast, another survey 
conducted in 2004 at Nanjing, the capital state of the Jiansu Province found that 70% 
of Nanjing youth learned sexual knowledge from pornographic websites; and only 
1% learned from their parents.37 
The above information not only sketches out current social perceptions on the 
topic of sexual behaviour, relationships and gender issues in China, together with 
the photo scandal, they also address the politics of ‘desire’. On the one hand, China 
has a group of vibrant youth who are curious regarding sexual knowledge and 
much more liberal and open-minded in terms of sexual behaviours such as 
premarital sex; but at the same time, the older generations in China, despite the 
government’s encouragement, still find it difficult and embarrassing to teach, 
discuss and communicate about sex-related issues with the younger generation. 
The strong demand for but lack of supply of sexual knowledge reinforces the 
desire among Chinese youth to reach out to new technologies such as the Internet. 
As Rofel argues in her book Desiring China, the ability to express one’s desire is a 
tool to become more cosmopolitan and part of the world.38 But in a micro and 
personal sense, desire is a process of seeking what Rofel calls the ‘inner selves’.39 
The process of exploring, identifying and categorising these inner selves in fact is a 
process of identity negotiation and cultural struggle.40 As Mangahas argues, ‘the 
popularity of scandal brings up the functional role of humours, rumour, news and 
gossip for creating consensus about reality, the truth, and social values,’41 Young 
people view these photos not only to fulfil their desire for sexual knowledge, but 
knowing that it is a traditional taboo, the photos provide them with an excellent 
opportunity to evade the social order and even resist it. The process of evasion and 
resistant creates a new identity that is exclusively defining some of the liberal 
characteristics of the Chinese youth today. By rejecting and running away from 
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traditional discipline in suppressing sexual desire, the Chinese youth use the 
incident and the Internet to distance themselves from traditional values, and play 
up their willingness of embracement and engagement with the wider world. 
Furthermore, this process of identity and cultural negotiation in the name of sexual 
desire and eroticism also reinforces and enlarges cultural struggles between the 
generations in China. The advent of the photo scandal, therefore, enlarges this gap.  
The huge publicity generated by the photo scandal quickly transformed it into 
the dominant social topic at the time. The embarrassing topic of sex became 
unavoidable, and the Internet has also proven itself to be a realm potentially free 
from traditional conservatism in China. The incident and the Internet material more 
generally provide a rare opportunity for many Chinese youths to explore the 
supposedly filthy and scary territory of sex, eroticism, relationships and personal 
lifestyle choices. But at the same time, the huge publicity of the explicit sexual 
content, images and messages that the photo scandal is a process of normalisation, 
making the cultural taboos of sex and eroticism an everyday discourse throughout 
the entire social spectrum. On the flip side, this process also angers and frightens 
the older generations in China as the scandal represents a lack of control, and the 
collapse of cultural disciplines. Parents and school teachers failed to control the 
flow of the photos, and they failed to stop the younger generation from viewing 
and discussing these photos and the rumours behind them. As an incident of ‘out-
of-control’, the moral panics that come with the photo scandal fill the mainstream 
sphere in China. The public engagement of and exposure to the topic of eroticism 
and sex in such an open and blatantly manner becomes a major indication to 
confirm parents’ and schools’ concerns of the Internet. The idea that the Internet is 
a filthy space that is full of erotic and violent contents become a shared concerned 
among the Chinese parents. As the development of the Internet often come with 
great social controversies and concerns from the parental generations, more 
extreme view even perceives ‘the Net as akin to addictive drugs, in particular 
opium’.42 The Chinese government is also too happy to assist the growth of such a 
negative perception about the Internet by officially defining Internet addiction as a 
‘psychiatric diseases’.43 The fact that the photo scandal shifts the public discourses 
away from a major natural disasters (the Snow disasters), to a melodrama-driven 
photo scandal, reinforces the concerns about the ‘harmful addictive’ effect to the 
youth. As the Internet users were actively (re)distributing, viewing, discussing 
about the photos and the potential celebrity dramas’ behind the photos, in 
conjunction with the mentioned perceptions of eroticism and sexual desire being 
erosive and evil, many parents and schools read this Internet-driven photo scandal 
signalling the moral declines and material corruption among the Chinese youth. 
And ‘there seems to be a shared understanding among Chinese parents that the 
Internet… is part and parcel of such deterioration of morality among the younger 
generation’.44 This ‘moral decline’ relates to a larger question about identity and 
cultural ownership in China in the future. The question that Rofel observes about 
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who is going to represent Chinese culture and how it will be represented45 becomes 
relevant in the debate of the photo scandal.  
 
4. The ‘spoiled generation’ as the new generation in China  
Rofel’s question on cultural identity, which became the central concern 
throughout the photo scandal, reveals a major site of struggle between the Chinese 
youth and their older generations throughout the history of China. The photo 
scandal played out the global moral panics about new technologies in a Chinese 
context. Many scholars are critical of the mainstream view on blaming the 
technologies, as they believe the problem of youth and media lies within the 
traditional perception of young people. Tapscott notes, ‘A commonly held view is 
that our children are greedy, self-centered, and concerned only about their own 
possessions and financial success’46. However, Tapscott believes the ‘conventional 
wisdom is dead wrong’,47 as blaming the technology is simply a blame game that 
covers up more serious and urgent social problems.48 The moral panics and social 
unrests regarding to young people’s usage of the Internet ‘relate to much broader 
concerns, in which the media may in fact have a much less significant – and even 
contradictory – role ‘.49 Even though the academic field commonly accepts that 
negative images are due to misconceptions concerning the younger generation, this 
type of stereotype of youth still dominates in everyday life. 
Among all the economic reform policies in China, one of the most important, 
as well as controversial, policies is the One Child Policy. Beside the human rights 
issue, this population control has had an extensive impact on Chinese society. The 
traditional Chinese notion of ‘big family’ has vanished since the introduction of the 
policy in 1979. Rather than competing with potential siblings, the Chinese who 
were born after 1979 became the ‘only one’. A popular view in mainstream 
Chinese society today perceives these new generations are problematic and 
concerning because they are the central focus of their entire families. The 
preciousness of being the ‘only one’ not only allows them to possess all in the 
financial and material priorities, but the indulgence and spoiling by their older 
generations. Chan et al. argue, ‘these children grow up as the pride and joy of 
adoring parents and grandparents and are beginning to be known as the spoiled 
generation’.50  These only children are considered the ‘Little Emperor and Little 
Princess’ in Chinese families today. As Reese claims that the one child policy will 
eventually lead to ‘a whole lot of spoiled kids’, and this problem in China is ‘so 
acute that it’s changing how society functions’ 51. The Cultural Revolution has 
largely stolen nice childhood memories from generations of Chinese. Now, Mao’s 
children are parents themselves, and they have only one child between partners, so 
the child is ‘their only hope’52 and is absolutely precious to them. ‘Many adults 
wildly overcompensate in doting on their kids’53 because the Chinese parents want 
to give everything they lost during the Cultural Revolution to their ‘only hope’ in 
life. The rapid Chinese economic growth also witnessed even more luxurious 
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lifestyles of these ‘only child’ generations. Thus, the new generation in China is 
generally known as soft, mindless, arrogant, and lacking in discipline. The advent 
of the Internet reinforces and supports these mainstream stereotypes on the Chinese 
youth.  
However, understanding the moral panics about the Internet solely caused by 
the population control policy is limited. The social criticism of spoiling and ‘Little 
Emperor’ phenomenon in fact has a long historical root. As a Confucianism culture, 
young people are always treated as juniors in both the family and society in 
China,54 as the Chinese culture likes to draw an exponential correlation between 
age and wisdom. As a subdominant social group in the power structures, Chinese 
youth are taught to fulfil their filial duties55 : not only do ordinary individuals have 
to obey the authorities, but, younger generations need to obey the older generations; 
less wise groups need to obey the wisdom of intellectuals (i.e. students must obey 
and respect their teachers). While looking after parents and respecting elders 
should be highly regarded and encouraged in any social setting, the realities behind 
the seemingly simple ‘respecting’ and ‘caring’ often involve excessive suppression 
of personal desires and expression (such as the suppression of sexual desire) 
through self-sacrifices and obedience in a traditional context. In a political sense, 
these traditional guidelines support the government’s communist ideas of 
‘collectivism’ and justify the government’s suppression on individual expressions 
and rights. However, the rapid economic development contradicts these traditional 
and political ideologies, and the new media, provides an alternative public sphere 
for the young Chinese to explore their own identities by developing their own 
cultural recognitions and political interpretations in a global context. The photo 
scandal not only indicates the rise of individualism, but it is an individualist culture 
that is heavily driven by the rise of consumerism, materialism, and the western 
capitalism. The celebration of and attraction to pop-stars, the desire for sexual 
knowledge, and increasing awareness of political issues, those eroticism and sexual 
contents of the photo scandal are only the wrapping paper of the more intense and 
dynamic ideological transformation and power (re)negotiation in China today.  
The clash of different values and interests is amplified through the so-called 
‘moral panic’ on youth and their favoured media and communication technologies. 
The long traditional failure to openly and directly address the topic of ‘sex’ directly 
resembles the subversive culture that the Chinese youth has played out throughout 
the photo scandal. The social perception of the photo scandal being ‘out-of-control’ 
signifies the increasingly ‘disobeying’ protests that come from the younger 
generations, who are using the cyberspace to develop their own social and cultural 
identities. While in a political sense, the format of the public discussions about the 
photo scandal as a liberal democratic forum rather than a state led socialist 
commune and the political protests against and humiliation of the Chinese 
authorities exemplifies the mainstream view of youth culture as being ‘out of 
control’. The cyber engagement of the photo scandal contained the voices of those 
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who are socially vulnerable and politically powerless. These representations not 
only voice the youth’s desires for a more open understanding of the natural human 
self, but also contain their views about the greater social and political development 
in China. Internet forums where people are downloading the photos and discussing 
the associated celebrity rumours also became the sites for political activism. For 
example, a post on 7 February 2008 named ‘Edison Chen’s erotic photo gate and 
the Hong Kong stories’ on the Tianya Discussion Forum, one of the most popular 
BBSs in China, supports the general public’s criticism of the Hong Kong police 
and judicial system.56 This post received a tremendous response in that it received 
1,484,646 hits and 2055 responses. Many comments on this post actually argued 
that the failure of Hong Kong’s democratic and judicial system is the result of 
mainland China’s intervention. A participant named tibbs believes democracy is 
vanishing in Hong Kong. Some others extended tibbs’s idea and argued that the 
photo scandal reflects the decline of social and judicial justice in Hong Kong, and 
thus the dream of peacefully re-uniting with Taiwan has become impossible as 
Hong Kong has set a bad example and proves the failure of the One Country, Two 
Systems framework. The online discussion of the photo scandal, which is 
supposedly a celebrity melodrama, gradually transformed itself into a social and 
political discussion. This process is a political inclusion as those who were 
politically powerless, financially struggling, and culturally excluded, now, through 
the ‘erotic’ engagement with the photo scandal, through emotional outbursts over 
celerity affairs, extend their dissatisfaction and protest from below, and evade the 
conventional political communication formats that are guarded by the mainstream 
establishments. 
The cyber political activism of the photo scandal also defines the 
government’s intention to work with the traditional establishments, and the Web 
Site Correction Campaign works as a justification and protection for their political 
assets. Blaming new media and the youth are in fact making the media ‘as 
scapegoat [and] can be blamed for social unrest, crime, breakdown of the family, 
political apathy, thereby simplifying and trivialising the underlying social 
problems’.57 The concerns and panics about the youth and the Internet are framed 
by more profound and serious social, economic and political elements. At one level, 
it is about the immediate ideological contests and social unrests that are triggered 
by a subject (sexual desire) that is feared and avoided by the traditions. But on the 
broader perspective, it is a matter of future representation and power transition. 
Due to the development of the Internet, the ideological departure of the Chinese 
youth today, from conservatism to liberalism, from socialism to capitalism and 
from localism to globalism, are proving to be a greater fear to the older Chinese 
generations than the erotic photos themselves, because this ideological 
transformation underpins the serious question of China’s identity on the global 
stage. As Rofel points out,  
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Struggles over cultural citizenship are contests over new 
schemes of hierarchical difference, over who represents the 
cultural competence to carry China into the future and to create 
wealth and power for the nation under neoliberal capitalism.58  
 
The political contests and struggles of the photo scandal are not merely about the 
justification of the CCP’s authority; this particular struggle is also on the cultural 
front, which is dominated by concepts of identity representation and creation.  Who 
is going to represent China and how China as a country and a civilisation will be 
represented in the new global order are in fact more urgent concerns that trigger the 
widespread controversies of the photo scandal. The cybercultures associated with 
the photo scandal ran against traditions by revealing things and engaging into 
topics that are feared by the traditional values.  Therefore, the photo scandal is 
perceived to be ‘out of control’; not only did the government fail to stop the photo 
distribution, but parents and teachers were unable to prevent the youth viewing and 
discussing the photos and their melodramas. The active cyber engagement signifies 
the power of the Internet as the site of an alternative public sphere in China. The 
fact that no one in China at the time can be immune from the airing of the scandal 
and its ideas of sexual desire and eroticism also illustrates the relevance of the 
cybercultures to the offline everydayness in China. The scandal reveals a youth-
based cyberculture that is growing stronger online and actively searching for 
desired information; but at the same time, there is also a strong counter-force 
opposing this type of cyberculture throughout the entire social hierarchy in China.  
 
5. Power transition in China 
Mao Zedong has once famously said: 
 
The world is yours, as well as ours, but eventually, it is yours. 
You young people, full of vigour and vitality, are in the bloom of 
life, like the sun at eight or nine in the morning. Our hope is 
placed on you.59 
 
Speaking in front of a group of young Chinese students studying in Moscow, 
Mao’s words in 1957 seems to become more relevant to China than ever before. 
Writing in an age of transformation, we are lucky enough to witness the rise of a 
new generation of Chinese in that the post-1980s Chinese (who are the first 
generation of Chinese born during the economic reform years) are now gradually 
taking over the country. However, the power transition has just begun and it is far 
from completion. China today is experiencing a generational and ideological 
transformation. Although generational transition is a natural trend and an on-going 
process, in China this time it is not simply about the elders passing on to the youth, 
and the Chinese experience in the past thirty years proves this particular 
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generational transition is a controversial and complicated one: it is the transition 
from a socialistic China to a post-socialistic China, from collective values to 
individualistic values, and from localisation to globalisation.60 The complexities of 
this particular generational transformation are not simply about the older handing 
over power to the younger, but it is more like conservatism handing over to a new 
liberalism (with a strong western capitalistic flavour); it is about the reshuffle of 
national and cultural values; and this has proven to be problematic and difficult. As 
Sima and Pugsley correctly point out, ‘in this postsocialist China, individual 
expression, achievement and pleasure have taken over the arguably ‘collective 
interest’ mentality that marked the older, Mao generation’. 61   The changing 
materialistic environment forces many Chinese, especially those who have grown 
up during this process, to re-think their social and political perceptions. The rise of 
a ‘me culture’ among the young Chinese netizens, in that self-expression and 
individualism have become the driving forces for the successful diffusion of the 
Internet; and more importantly, the adoption of individualism and consumerism 
‘suggests a major departure from previous generations’.62 The significance of self-
expression and connecting with others who share similar ideas and opinions for an 
exclusive network lies within the differences from tradition. The ideas of 
individualism and focusing on self-expression and searching for self-identity have 
undermined the traditional Chinese values and the Party’s political ideology. 
Furthermore, the ‘me culture’ resonates with western democratic values rather than 
the Communist collective ideal. The changing communication culture among the 
young Chinese construct a sharp division with older generations.  
However what is more concerning, or actually frightening, to the older 
Chinese generation is not simply the superior or different life experience the post-
80s generations possess; rather, it is that the new generations seem to possess 
greater wisdom in terms of new technologies than most of the older generations. 
As Tapscott argues, ‘for the first time in history, children are more comfortable, 
knowledgeable and literate than their parents about an innovation central to 
society’.63 Sima and Pugsley also agree and argue that within a Chinese context, 
young Chinese today are ‘more affluent and better educated than their parents’ 
generation’. 64  It seems the new generation, or what Tapscott calls the ‘Net 
generation’65, and what the Chinese call the ‘post-80s, -90s and 2000 generations’, 
have already bypassed the previous generations in many ways. These 
interpretations develop a sharp contrast with the commonly held ‘spoiled 
generations’ view by the older generations in China. Although this is not a 
phenomenon exclusive to China, this trend is more obvious and significant in 
China. The pre-80s generations not only have been financially damaged by 
tragedies like the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, but these 
tragedies have taken educational opportunities from these Chinese. Many people 
born during the Cultural Revolution have hardly completed schooling. This 
relatively lower educational level becomes a major impediment to them mastering 
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the Internet and computing technologies. As an incident being ‘out of control’, the 
photo scandal illustrates the very fear of the older generations regarding the 
Internet in the sense that they are unable to control their children as their ancestors 
have done for thousands of years. The notion of filial piety in itself is evolving in 
China today. Blind obedience and personal suppression are no longer symbolising 
the respect to elders, but the current technological development challenges and 
even subverts the long traditional discipline in China. The Internet, in many ways, 
encourages ‘disobedient’ minds in China. In the photo scandal, the traditional 
establishments lost their authorities of being the mainstream voice of public 
communications. The agendas and interests of young netizens, however, drove the 
development of public discourses. This changing power balance further reinforces 
the fears and moral panics about the new technologies and ideologies, and the 
nature of the photo scandal and its associated cybercultures further reinforce the 
cultural and political intrusion that the Internet has brought to China.  As the 
cybercultures are providing liberal ideas to their Chinese users today, co-existing 
but competing values underpin the bitter struggle between the two camps in the 
new media era. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Labelling subcultures as ‘rebel’ and ‘resistance’ against the mainstream is 
common.66 The rise of cybercultures and the censorship attempts associated with it 
are another example of a struggle between the establishment and rebels. However, 
in the case of the photo scandal, the idea of ‘establishment’ and ‘rebels’ are not 
defined by political or economic power; this time, traditional morality come into 
play, and the Internet becomes the site of a generational struggle instead of a class 
one. The rise of the youth-orientated cyberculture reflects a dynamical grassroots 
political culture in China. The photo scandal shows that political communication 
can take place in a non-conventional format. The seemingly emotional outburst, 
excessive expression and the ‘irresponsible’ cultural reproduction are in fact a form 
of social inclusion and a process of public rationalisation. But the photo scandal 
also makes us aware of the multidimensional control mechanism, which does not 
solely come from the government.  
The conflicts between the Chinese youth and older generation have a far 
reaching consequence in terms of policy setting. The nature of the photo scandal 
and the public response to the scandal over the Internet has created much 
discomfort for the ruling older generations in China. Not only can they not avoid 
discussing the topic of sex and eroticism, the older generations in China also fail to 
control the engagement of the younger generation in exploring the photo scandal 
through the Internet. The photo scandal encourages a grass-roots subversive and 
disobedient culture by inviting the voicing of opinion from a group of Chinese 
whose ideas are often undermined due to stereotypical beliefs and perceptions. One 
must understand the social movement among the Chinese youth in relation to this 
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social group’s political and historical potential. As mentioned, youth struggles and 
movements often can be transformed into mass political campaigns and 
movements; Chinese youth have demonstrated their strong and consistent 
subversive potential throughout history; their ‘heated mind’ can transform into 
radical political and social movements, which demonstrate the political potential 
and practices of Chinese youth. The rise of the Internet creates further 
complications and dilemmas for the Chinese government in its attempts to exert 
control and authority over this unpredictable social group. The phenomenal 
publicity of the photo scandal confirms the active nature of the youth culture in 
China, but at the same time, the photo scandal also reveals the growing and strong 
counter-youth and counter-cyber culture.  
It seems that the Chinese government is able to capture the general opinion 
among the mainstream public in China. In order to legitimate its regulation and 
intervention in the online world, the government is utilising intergenerational 
conflicts that the Internet culture has revealed. The photo scandal provides an 
excellent case study to critically examine the political motivations and strategies of 
the Chinese government in the new media era. The photo scandal illustrates how 
mainstream Chinese society is utilising the internal contradictions of the youth 
online culture to justify its intervention with the assistance of the state. The 
incident triggers the appearance of external social forces that are constantly in 
battle with those socially and ideologically privileged values. The on-going battle 
between the traditional and popular, conservative and liberal, old and young, as 
illustrated by the photo scandal,  traditional codes can interfere with the growth of 
cybercultures as much as the government.   
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